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Abstract Intuitionistic epistemic logic introduces an epistemic opera-
tor, which reflects the intended BHK semantics of intuitionism, to in-
tuitionistic logic. The fundamental assumption concerning intuitionistic
knowledge and belief is that it is the product of verification. The BHK in-
terpretation of intuitionistic logic has a precise formulation in the Logic
of Proofs and its arithmetical semantics. We show here that this in-
terpretation can be extended to the notion of verification upon which
intuitionistic knowledge is based, thereby providing the systems of in-
tuitionistic epistemic logic extended by an epistemic operator based on
verification with an arithmetical semantics too.
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1 Introduction
The intended semantics for intuitionistic logic is the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmo-
gorov (BHK) interpretation, which holds that a proposition is true if proved.
The systems of intuitionistic epistemic logic, the IEL family introduced in [5],
extend intuitionistic logic with an epistemic operator and interpret it in a manner
reflecting the BHK semantics. The fundamental assumption concerning knowl-
edge interpreted intuitionistically is that knowledge is the product of verifica-
tion, where a verification is understood to be a justification sufficient to warrant
a claim to knowledge which is not necessarily a strict proof.
In [5] the notion of verification was treated intuitively. Here we show that ver-
ification can also be given an arithmetical interpretation, thereby showing that
the notion of verification assumed in an intuitionistic interpretation of knowledge
has an exact model.
∗ In Logical Foundations of Computer Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
9537, 317–330, Springer, 2016. Due to several publisher’s errors the publisher failed
to include a corrected version of the paper for publication. The paper published
in LNCS 9537 is an uncorrected proof which contains various errors introduced
by the publisher, and lacks changes submitted to, and approved for inclusion by,
the publisher. This is the version that should have been published, and should be
considered the official one.
Following Go¨del [11] it is well known that intuitionistic logic can be embed-
ded into the classical modal logic S4 regarded as a provability logic. Artemov
[2] formulated the Logic of Proofs, LP, and showed that S4 in turn can be in-
terpreted in LP, and that LP has an arithmetical interpretation as a calculus
of explicit proofs in Peano Arithmetic PA.1 Accordingly this makes precise the
BHK semantics for intuitionistic logic. Intuitionistic logic, then, can be regarded
as an implicit logic of proofs, and its extension with an epistemic/verification
operator in the systems IEL− and IEL (given in Section 2) can be regarded as
logics of implicit proofs, verification and their interaction.
This is of interest for a number of reasons. It shows that the notion of verifica-
tion on which intuitionistic epistemic logic is based is coherent and can be made
concrete, and does so in a manner consonant with the intended BHK interpre-
tation of the epistemic operator. Further, given intuitionistic logic’s importance
in computer science as well as the need for a constructive theory of knowledge,
finding a precise provability model for verification and intuitionistic epistemic
logic (see Section 5) is well-motivated.
2 Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic
According to the BHK semantics a proposition, A, is true if there is a proof of
it and false if the assumption that there is a proof of A yields a contradiction.
This is extended to complex propositions by the following clauses:
– a proof of A ∧B consists in a proof of A and a proof of B;
– a proof of A ∨B consists in giving either a proof of A or a proof of B;
– a proof of A→ B consists in a construction which given a proof of A returns
a proof of B;
– ¬A is an abbreviation for A→ ⊥, and ⊥ is a proposition that has no proof.
The salient property of verification-based justification, in the context of the
BHK semantics, is that it follows from intuitionistic truth, hence
A→ KA (Co-Reflection)
is valid on a BHK reading. Since any proof is a verification, the intuitionistic
truth of a proposition yields that the proposition is verified.
By similar reasoning the converse principle
KA→ A (Reflection)
is not valid on a BHK reading. A verification need not be, or yield a method for
obtaining, a proof, hence does not guarantee the intuitionistic truth of a propo-
sition. Reflection expresses the factivity of knowledge in a classical language,
intuitionistically factivity is expressed by
KA→ ¬¬A. (Intuitionistic Factivity)
1 As opposed to provability in PA, the calculus of which is the modal logic GL, see [6].
The basic system of intuitionistic epistemic logic, incorporating minimal as-
sumptions about the nature of verification, is the system IEL−. IEL− can be seen
as the system formalising intuitionistic belief.
Definition 1 (IEL−). The list of axioms and rules of IEL− consists of:
IE0. Axioms of propositional intuitionistic logic.
IE1. K(A→ B)→ (KA→ KB)
IE2. A→ KA
Modus Ponens.
It is consistent with IEL− that false propositions can be verified. It is desir-
able, however, that false propositions not be verifiable; to be a logic of knowledge
the logic should reflect the truth condition on knowledge, i.e. factivity – that it is
not possible to know falsehoods. The system IEL incorporates the truth condition
and hence can be viewed as an intuitionistic logic of knowledge.
Definition 2 (IEL). The list of axioms and rules for IEL are those for IEL− with
the additional axiom:
IE3. KA→ ¬¬A.
Given Axiom IE2 the idea that it is not possible to know a falsehood can be
equivalently expressed by ¬K⊥.2 For the following we will use this form of the
truth condition in place of Axiom IE3.
Kripke models were defined for both systems, and soundness and complete-
ness shown with respect to them, see [5].
3 Embedding Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic into Classical
Modal Logic of Verification
The well known Go¨del translation yields a faithful embedding of the intuitionistic
propositional calculus, IPC, into the classical modal logic S4.3 By extending S4
with a verification modality V, the embedding can be extended to IEL− and IEL,
and shown to remain faithful, see [14].
S4V− is the basic logic of provability and verification.
Definition 3 (S4V− Axioms). The list of axioms and rules of S4V− consists
of:
A0. The axioms of S4 for ✷.
A1. V(A→ B)→ (VA→ VB)
2 Or indeed, ¬(KA∧¬A), ¬A → ¬KA or ¬¬(K → A), all are equivalent to Axiom IE3
given Axiom IE2, see [5].
3 The soundness of the translation was proved by Go¨del [11] while the faithfulness was
proved by McKinsey and Tarski [12]. See [8] for a semantic, and [15] for a syntactic
proof.
A2. ✷A→ VA
R1. Modus Ponens
R2. ✷-Necessitation
⊢ A
⊢ ✷A.
As with IEL we add the further condition that verifications should be consis-
tent.
Definition 4 (S4V). S4V is S4V− with the additional axiom:4
A3. ¬✷V⊥.
Kripke models for each system were outlined in [14] and the systems shown
to be sound and complete with respect to them.
For IEL− and IEL their embedding into S4V− and S4V respectively, is faithful.
For an IEL− or IEL formula F , tr(F ) is the translation of F according to the rule
box every sub-formula
into the language of S4V− or S4V respectively.
Theorem 1 (Embedding). The Go¨del translation faithfully embeds IEL−and
IEL into S4V−and S4V, respectively:
IEL−, IEL ⊢ F ⇔ S4V−, S4V ⊢ tr(F ).
Proof. See [14].
4 Logics of explicit proofs and verification
Go¨del [11] suggested that the modal logic S4 be considered as a provability cal-
culus. This was given a precise interpretation by Artemov, see [2, 4], who showed
that explicit proofs in Peano Arithmetic, PA, was the model of provability which
S4 described. The explicit counter-part of S4 is the Logic of Proofs LP in which
each ✷ in S4 is replaced by a term denoting an explicit proof. Since intuitionistic
logic embeds into S4 the intended BHK semantics for IPC as an implicit calculus
of proofs is given an explicit formulation in LP, and hence an arithmetical seman-
tics. Here we show that this arithmetical interpretation can be further extended
to the Logic of Proofs augmented with a verification modality, providing S4V−
and S4V, and therefore IEL− and IEL with an arithmetical semantics. Similarly
to the foundational picture regarding the relation between IPC, S4 and LP (see
[2]) we have that
IEL →֒ S4V →֒ LPV5
The basic system of explicit proofs and verifications LPV− is defined thus:
4 [14] presented a stronger version of S4V with ¬V⊥ instead of ¬✷V⊥. The weaker
axiom presented here is sufficient for the embedding; one can readily check that the
Go¨del translation of ¬K⊥, ✷¬✷V✷⊥, is derivable in S4V as formulated here. The
weaker axiom allows for a uniform arithmetical interpretation of verification.
5 Similar embeddings hold for IEL−, S4V−, and LPV−.
Definition 5 (Explicit Language).
The language of LPV− consists of:
1. The language of classical propositional logic;
2. A verification operator V;
3. Proof variables, denoted by x, y, x1, x2 . . .;
4. Proof constants, denoted by a, b, c, c1, c2 . . .;
5. Operations on proof terms, building complex proof terms from simpler ones
of three types:
(a) Binary operation · called application;
(b) Binary operation + called plus;
(c) Unary operation ! called proof checker;
6. Proof terms: any proof variable or constant is a proof term; if t and s are
proof terms so are t · s, t+ s and !t.
7. Formulas: A propositional letter p is a formula; if A and B are formulas
then so are ¬A, A ∧B, A ∨B, A→ B, VA, t:A.
Formulas of the type t:A are read as “t is a proof A”.
Definition 6 (LPV−). The list of axioms and rules of LPV− consists of:
E0. Axioms of propositional classical logic.
E1. t:(A→ B)→ (s:A→ (t · s):B)
E2. t:A→ A
E3. t:A→!t:t:A
E4. t:A→ (s+ t):A, t:A→ (t+ s):A
E5. V(A→ B)→ (VA→ VB)
E6. t:A→ VA
R1. Modus Ponens
R2. Axiom Necessitation:
⊢ A
⊢ c:A
where A is any axiom and c is some proof
constant.
Definition 7 (LPV). The system LPV is LPV− with the additional axiom:
E7. ¬t:V⊥
A constant specification, CS, is a set {c1:A1, c2:A2 . . . } of formulas such that
each Ai is an axiom from the lists above, and each ci is a proof constant. This set
is generated by each use of the constant necessitation rule in an LPV− or LPV
proof. The axiom necessitation rule can be replaced with a ‘ready made’ constant
specification which is added to LPV− or LPV as a set of extra axioms. For such
a CS let LPV−-CS and LPV-CS mean LPV− and LPV, respectively, minus the
axiom necessitation rule plus the members of CS as additional axioms.
A proof term, t, is called a ground term if it contains no proof variables, but
is built only from proof constants and operations on those constants.
LPV− and LPV are able to internalise their own proofs, that is if
A1 . . . An, y1:B1 . . . yn:Bn ⊢ F
then for some term p(x1 . . . xn, y1 . . . yn)
x1:A1 . . . xn:An, y1:B1 . . . yn:Bn ⊢ p(x1 . . . xn, y1 . . . yn):F,
see [2]. As a consequence LPV− and LPV have the constructive necessitation
rule: for some ground proof term t,
⊢ F
⊢ t:F.
This yields in turn:
Lemma 1 (V Necessitation). V-Necessitation
⊢ A
⊢ VA
is derivable in LPV−
and LPV.
Proof. Assume ⊢ A, then by constructive necessitation ⊢ t:A for some ground
proof term t, hence by Axiom E6 ⊢ VA.
Note that the Deduction Theorem holds for both LPV− and LPV.
5 Arithmetical Interpretation of LPV− and LPV
We give an arithmetical interpretation of LPV− and LPV by specifying a trans-
lation of the formulas of LPV− and LPV into the language of Peano Arithmetic,
PA. We assume that a coding of the syntax of PA is given. n denotes a natural
number and n the corresponding numeral. pFq denotes the numeral of the Go¨del
number of a formula F . For readability we suppress the overline for numerals and
corner quotes for the Go¨del number of formulas, and trust that the appropriate
number or numeral, as context requires, can be recovered.6
Definition 8 (Normal Proof Predicate). A normal proof predicate is a
provably ∆ formula Prf(x, y) such that for every arithmetical sentence F the
following holds:
1. PA ⊢ F ⇔ for some n ∈ ω,Prf(n, F )
2. A proof proves only a finite number of things; i.e. for every k the set T (k) =
{l|Prf(k, l)} is finite.7
3. Proofs can be joined into longer proofs; i.e. for any k and l there is an n s.t.
T (k) ∪ T (l) ⊆ T (n).
Example 1. An example of a numerical relation that satisfies the definition of
Prf(x, y) is the standard proof predicate Proof(x, y) the meaning of which is
“x is the Go¨del number of a derivation of a formula with the Go¨del number y”.
6 E.g. by techniques found in [6] and [9].
7 I.e. T (k) is the set of theorems proved by the proof k.
Theorem 2. For every normal proof predicate Prf(x, y) there exist recursive
functions m(x, y), a(x, y) and c(x) such that for any arithmetical formulas F
and G and all natural numbers k and n the following formulas hold:
1. (Prf(k, F → G) ∧ Prf(n, F ))→ Prf(m(k, n), G)
2. Prf(k, F )→ Prf(a(k, n), F ), Prf(n, F )→ Prf(a(k, n), F )
3. Prf(k, F )→ Prf(c(k),Prf(k, F )).
Proof. See [2].
Definition 9 (Verification Predicate for LPV−). A verification predicate is
a provably Σ formula Ver(x) satisfying the following properties, for arithmetical
formulas F and G:
1. PA ⊢ Ver(F → G)→ (Ver(F )→ Ver(G))
2. For each n, PA ⊢ Prf(n, F )→ Ver(F ).
These are properties which a natural notion of verification satisfies.
Let Bew(x) be the standard provability predicate,8 and Con(PA) be the state-
ment which expresses that PA is consistent, i.e. ¬Bew(⊥). ¬Con(PA) correspond-
ingly is Bew(⊥).
Example 2. The following are examples of a verification predicate Ver(x):
1. “Provability in PA”, i.e. Ver(x) = Bew(x); for a formula F Ver(F ) is ∃xPrf(x, F ).
2. “Provability in PA + Con(PA)” i.e. Ver(x) = Bew(Con(PA) → x); one ex-
ample of a formula for which Ver(x) holds in this sense is just the formula
Con(PA). Such verification is capable of verifying propositions not provable
in PA.
3. “Provability in PA + ¬Con(PA)” i.e. Ver(x) = Bew(¬Con(PA) → x); an
example of a verifiable formula which is not provable in PA, is the formula
¬Con(PA). Such verification is capable of verifying false propositions.
4. ⊤, i.e. Ver(x) = ⊤; that is for any formula F Ver(F ) = ⊤, hence any F is
verified.
Lemma 2. PA ⊢ F ⇒ PA ⊢ Ver(F ).
Proof. Assume PA ⊢ F , then by Definition 8 there is an n such that Prf(n, F ) is
true, hence PA ⊢ Prf(n, F ), and by Definition 9 part 2 PA ⊢ Ver(F ).
We now define an interpretation of the language of LPV− into the language
of Peano Arithmetic. An arithmetical interpretation takes a formula of LPV−
and returns a formula of Peano Arithmetic; we show the soundness of such an
interpretation, if F is valid in LPV− then for any arithmetical interpretation ∗
F ∗ is valid in PA.9
8 With the standard multi-conclusion proof predicate in which a proof p is a proof of
F if F occurs somewhere in p.
9 A corresponding completeness theorem is left for future work, as is the development
of a system with explicit verification terms, in addition to proof terms, realising the
verification modality of S4V− or S4V.
Definition 10 (Arithmetical Interpretation for LPV−). An arithmetical
interpretation for LPV− has the following items:
– A normal proof predicate, Prf, with the functions m(x, y), a(x, y) and c(x)
as in Definition 8 and Theorem 2;
– A verification predicate, Ver, satisfying the conditions in Definition 9;
– An evaluation of propositional letters by sentences of PA;
– An evaluation of proof variables and constants by natural numbers.
An arithmetical interpretation is given inductively by the following clauses:
(p)∗ = p an atomic sentence of PA
⊥∗ = ⊥
(A ∧B)∗ = A∗ ∧B∗
(A ∨B)∗ = A∗ ∨B∗
(A→ B)∗ = A∗ → B∗
(t · s)∗ = m(t∗, s∗)
(t+ s)∗ = a(t∗, s∗)
(!t)∗ = c(t∗)
(t:F )∗ = Prf(t∗, F ∗)
(VF )∗ = Ver(F ∗)
Let X be a set of LPV− formulas, then X∗ is the set of all F ∗’s such that F ∈
X . For a constant specification, CS, a CS-interpretation is an interpretation ∗
such that all formulas from CS∗ are true. An LPV− formula is valid if F ∗ is true
under all interpretations ∗. F is provably valid if PA ⊢ F ∗ under all interpreta-
tions ∗. Similarly, F is valid under constant specification CS if F ∗ is true under
all CS-interpretations, and F is provably valid under constant specification CS if
PA ⊢ F ∗ under any CS-interpretation ∗.
Theorem 3 (Arithmetical Soundness of LPV−). For any CS-interpretation ∗
with a verification predicate as in Definition 9 any LPV−-CS theorem, F , is prov-
ably valid under constant specification CS:
LPV−-CS ⊢ F ⇒ PA ⊢ F ∗.
Proof. By induction on derivations in LPV−. The cases of the LP axioms are
proved in [2].
Case 1 (V(A→ B)→ (VA→ VB)).
[V(A→ B)→ (VA→ VB)]∗ ≡ Ver(F → G)→ (Ver(F )→ Ver(G)).
But PA ⊢ Ver(F → G)→ (Ver(F )→ Ver(G)) by Definition 9.
Case 2 (t:F → VF ).
[t:F → VF ]∗ ≡ Prf(t∗, F ∗)→ Ver(F ∗).
Likewise PA ⊢ Prf(t∗, F ∗)→ Ver(F ∗) holds by Definition 9.
This arithmetical interpretation can be extended to LPV. Everything is as
above except to Definition 9 we add the following item:
Definition 11 (Verification Predicate for LPV).
3. for any n, PA ⊢ ¬Prf(n,Ver(⊥)).
1–3 of Example 2 remain examples of a verification predicate which also
satisfies the above consistency property. In each case respectively Ver(⊥) is
1. Bew(⊥)
2. Bew(¬Bew(⊥)→ ⊥), i.e. Bew(¬Con(PA))
3. Bew(¬¬Bew(⊥)→ ⊥), i.e. Bew(Con(PA)).
All of these are false in the standard model of PA, and hence not provable in PA,
hence for each n PA ⊢ ¬Prf(n,Ver(⊥)).
4. Ver(⊥) = ⊤, is not an example of a verification predicate for LPV in the
sense of Definition 11: Ver(⊥) would be provable in PA, and hence there would
be an n for which PA ⊢ Prf(n,Ver(⊥)) holds, which contradicts Definition 11.
Theorem 4 (Arithmetical Soundness of LPV). For any CS-interpretation ∗
with a verification predicate as in Definition 11, if F is an LPV-CS theorem then
it is provably valid under constant specification CS:
LPV-CS ⊢ F ⇒ PA ⊢ F ∗.
Proof. Add to the proof of Theorem 3 the following case:
Case 3 (¬t:V⊥).
[¬t:V⊥]∗ ≡ ¬Prf(n,Ver(⊥)).
PA ⊢ ¬Prf(n,Ver(⊥)) holds by Definition 11.
6 Sequent Systems for S4V− and S4V
We give a sequent formulation of S4V− and S4V. We will denote the sequent
formulations by S4V−g, S4Vg respectively.
A sequent is a figure, Γ ⇒ ∆, in which Γ,∆ are multi-sets of formulas.
Definition 12 (S4V−g).
The axioms for the system S4V−g are:
Axioms
P ⇒ P , P atomic ⊥ ⇒
The structural and propositional rules are those of the system G1c from [15].
The modal rules are:
✷-Rules
Γ,X ⇒ ∆
(✷⇒)
Γ,✷X ⇒ ∆
✷Γ ⇒ X (⇒ ✷)
✷Γ ⇒ ✷X
V-Rule
✷Θ,Γ ⇒ X
(⇒ V)
✷Θ,VΓ ⇒ VX
Interaction-Rule
Γ,VX ⇒ ∆
(V/✷⇒)
Γ,✷X ⇒ ∆
Definition 13 (S4Vg Rules).
The system S4Vg is the system S4V−g with the additional axiom:
Weak Inconsistency Elimination
Γ ⇒ ✷V⊥ (⇒ ✷V)
Γ ⇒
Soundness can be shown by induction on the rules of S4V−g and S4Vg.
Completeness and cut-elimination can be shown in a manner similar to that of
[3].10
7 Realisation of S4V− and S4V
Here we show that each ✷ in an S4V− or S4V theorem can be replaced with a
proof term so that the result is a theorem of LPV− or LPV, and hence that IEL−
and IEL each have a proof interpretation. The converse, that for each LPV− or
LPV theorem if all the proof terms are replaced with ✷’s the result is a theorem
of S4V− or S4V also holds.
Definition 14 (Forgetful Projection). The forgetful projection, F 0 of an
LPV− or LPV formula is the result of replacing each proof term in F with a ✷.
Theorem 5. LPV−, LPV ⊢ F ⇒ S4V−, S4V ⊢ F 0 respectively.
Proof. By induction on S4V− derivations. The forgetful projections of Axioms E1
to E4 and E6 are ✷(A → B) → (✷A → ✷B), ✷A → A, ✷A → ✷✷A, ✷A →
✷A and ✷A → VA respectively, which are all provable in S4V−. The forgetful
projection of ¬t:V⊥ is ¬✷V⊥ which is provable in S4V. The rules are obvious.
Definition 15 (Realisation). A realisation, F r, of an S4V− or S4V formula F
is the result of substituting a proof term for each ✷ in F , such that if S4V−, S4V ⊢
F then LPV−, LPV ⊢ F r respectively.
Definition 16 (Polarity of Formulas). Occurrences of ✷ in F in G → F ,
F ∧G, G ∧ F , F ∨G, G ∨ F , ✷G and Γ ⇒ ∆,F have the same polarity as the
occurrence of ✷ in F .
Occurrences of ✷ in F from F → G, ¬F and F, Γ ⇒ ∆ have the polarity
opposite to that of the occurrence of ✷ in F .
10 See also [13] for another example of the method.
Definition 17 (Normal Realisation). A realisation r is called normal if all
negative occurrences of ✷ are realised by proof variables.
The informal reading of the S4 provability modality ✷ is existential, ✷F
means ‘there is a proof of F ’ (as opposed to the Kripke semantic reading which
is universal, i.e. ‘F holds in all accessible states’), normal realisations are the
ones which capture this existential meaning, see [2].
The realisation theorem, Theorem 6, shows that if a formula F is a theorem
of S4V− then there is a substitution of proof terms for every ✷ occurring in F
such that the result is a theorem of LPV−. This means that every ✷ in S4V−
can be thought of as standing for a (possibly complex) proof term in LPV−, and
hence, by Theorem 3, implicitly represents a specific proof in PA. The proof of
the realisation theorem consists in a procedure by which such a proof term can
be built, see [1, 2, 7, 10]. Given a (cut-free) proof in S4V−g we show how to
assign proof terms to each of the ✷’s occurring in the S4V−g proof so that each
sequent in the proof corresponds to a formula provable in LPV−; this is done by
constructing a Hilbert-style LPV− proof for the formula corresponding to each
sequent, so as to yield the desired realisation.
Occurrences of ✷ in an S4V−g derivation can be divided up into families
of related occurrences. Occurrences of ✷ are related if they occur in related
formulas of premises and conclusions of rules. A family of related occurrences
is given by the transitive closure of such a relation. A family is called essential
if it contains at least one occurrence of ✷ which is introduced by the (⇒ ✷)
rule. A family is called positive (respectively negative) if it consists of positive
(respectively negative) occurrences of ✷. It is important to note that the rules
of S4V−g preserve the polarities of ✷. Any ✷ introduced by (⇒ ✷) is positive,
while ✷’s introduced by (✷⇒) and the interaction rule are negative.
Theorem 6 (S4V− Realisation). If S4V− ⊢ F then LPV− ⊢ F r for some
normal realisation r.
Proof. If S4V−g ⊢ F then there exists a cut-free sequent proof, S, of the sequent
⇒ F . The realisation procedure described below (following [1, 2]) describes how
to construct a normal realisation r for any sequent in S.
Step 1. In every negative family and non-essential positive family replace
each occurrence of ✷B by x:B for a fresh proof variable x.
Step 2. Pick an essential family, f , and enumerate all of the occurrences
of the rule (⇒ ✷) which introduce ✷’s in this family. Let nf be the number of
such introductions. Replace all ✷’s of family f by the proof term v1 + . . .+ vnf
where vi does not already appear as the result of a realisation. Each vi is called
a provisional variable which will later be replaced with a proof term.
After this step has been completed for all families of ✷ there are no ✷’s left
in S.
Step 3. This proceeds by induction on the depth of a node in S. For each
sequent in S we show how to construct an LPV− formula, F r, corresponding to
that sequent, such that LPV− ⊢ F r.
The realisation of a sequent G = Γ ⇒ ∆ is an LPV− formula, Gr, of the
following form:
Ar1 ∧ . . . ∧A
r
n → B
r
1 ∨ . . . ∨B
r
m
The Ar’s and Br’s denote realisations already performed. Let Γ r, Θr stand for
conjunctions of formulas and ∆r for disjunctions of formulas; Γ r prefixed with
a V stands for conjunctions of V’ed formulas, i.e. VΓ rn = VA
r
1
∧ . . . ∧ VArn.
Similarly ~x:Θrp stands for x1:C
r
1
∧ . . . ∧ xp:C
r
p .
The cases realising the rules involving the propositional connectives and ✷
are shown in [2]11 (including how to replace provisional variables with terms).
Let us check the rules involving V.
Case 1 (Sequent G is the conclusion of a (⇒ V) rule: ✷Θ,VΓ ⇒ VX).
Gr = (~x:Θrp ∧VΓ
r
n)→ VX
r.
Now LPV− ⊢ ((~x:Θrp ∧ Γ
r
n) → X
r) ⇒ LPV− ⊢ ((~x:Θrp ∧ VΓ
r
n) → VX
r),
hence by the induction hypothesis the realisation of the premise of the rule,
(~x:Θrp ∧ Γ
r
n)→ X
r, is provable in LPV−, and hence:
LPV− ⊢ (~x:Θrp ∧VΓ
r
n)→ VX
r.
Case 2 (Sequent G is the conclusion of a (V/✷⇒) rule: Γ,✷X ⇒ ∆).
Gr = (Γ rn ∧ x:X
r)→ ∆rm.
Since x:A→ VA is provable in LPV− we have that
LPV− ⊢ ((Γ rn ∧VX
r)→ ∆rm)⇒ LPV
− ⊢ ((Γ rn ∧ x:X
r)→ ∆rm).
By the induction hypothesis the realisation of the formula corresponding to the
premise of the rule, (Γ rn ∧VX
r)→ ∆rm, is provable, and hence:
LPV− ⊢ (Γ rn ∧ x:X
r)→ ∆rm.
Step 4. After applying the above three steps each G ∈ S has been translated
into the language of LPV−, and been shown to be derivable in LPV−. Hence for
the formula corresponding to the root sequent, ⇒ F , we have that
LPV− ⊢ ⊤ → F r.
Since LPV− ⊢ ⊤
LPV− ⊢ F r.
Hence if S4V− ⊢ F there is a normal realisation r such that LPV− ⊢ F r.
11 The procedure described in [2] gives an exponential increase in the size of the deriva-
tion of the desired F r. [7] describes a modification of the procedure which gives only
a polynomial increase.
Theorem 7 (S4V Realisation). If S4V ⊢ F then LPV ⊢ F r for some normal
realisation r.
Proof. We simply add the following case to Step 3 of Theorem 6. The rest is the
same.
Case 3 (Sequent G is the conclusion of the Weak Inconsistency Elimination:
Γ ⇒ ).
Gr = Γ rn → ⊥.
LPV ⊢ Γ rn → x:V⊥ ⇒ LPV ⊢ Γ
r
n → ⊥, since LPV ⊢ x:V⊥ → ⊥, hence by
the induction hypothesis the realisation of the premise of the rule, Γ rn → x:V⊥,
is provable in LPV, and hence:
LPV ⊢ Γ rn → ⊥.
We are finally in a position to show that the systems of intuitionistic epistemic
logic, IEL− and IEL, do indeed have an arithmetical interpretation.
Definition 18. A formula of IEL− or IEL is called proof realisable if (tr(F ))r
is LPV−, respectively LPV, valid under some normal realisation r.
It follows that IEL− and IEL are sound with respect to proof realisability.
Theorem 8. If IEL−, IEL ⊢ F then F is proof realisable.
Proof. By Theorem 1 if IEL−, IEL ⊢ F then S4V−, S4V ⊢ tr(F ), respectively, and
by Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 if S4V−, S4V ⊢ tr(F ) then LPV−, LPV ⊢ (tr(F ))r
respectively.
By Theorems 3 and 4 LPV− and LPV are sound with respect to their arith-
metical interpretation, and hence by Theorem 8 so are IEL− and IEL.
8 Conclusion
Intuitionistic epistemic logic has an arithmetical interpretation, hence an inter-
pretation in keeping with its intended BHK reading. Naturally verification in
Peano Arithmetic, as outlined above, is not the only interpretation of verifi-
cation for which the principles of intuitionistic epistemic logic are valid. IEL−
and IEL may be interpreted as logics of the interaction between conclusive and
non-conclusive evidence, e.g. mathematical proof vs. experimental confirmation,
or observation vs. testimony. The question about exact interpretations for other
intuitive readings of these logics is left for further investigation.
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